J. Peter Neary and S. van Wijnbergen
In a recent paper in this JOURNAL, Eastwood and Venables (referred to as EV from now on) present an analysis of the macroeconomic consequence uf an oil discovery in an open-economy model which assumes perfect international capital mobility, rational exchange-rate expectations and sluggish adjustment of domestic goods prices. They show that anticipated future oil revenues can lead to a current recession if spending does not adjust at the moment the oil wealth becomes known (as in the United Kingdom). 1 However, while their analysis points t'.l potential problems of timing in adjusting to an oil discovery, its implications are in fact relatively optimistic. According to the model presented by EV, no recession can arise if spending is allowed to adjust immediately; further, when there is a time lag between the revelation of higher oil wealth and the increase in spending it allows, the recession that results will be followed by a boom period after spending adjusts.
These results contrast sharply with those of a recent paper by Buiter and Purvis (1983) , whose model assumptions are very similar to those of EV. Although Buiter and Purvis say explicitly (p. 223) that 'oil shocks are unlikely to lead to unemployment', a careful reading of their paper shows that this outcome is indeed consistent with their model for many plausible parameter values. However, because they are primarily concerned with the effects of an oil price rise rather than of an oil discovery, and because they adopt a very different approach to analysing their model from that of EV, it is difficult to compare the two papers.
In this note we attempt to reconcile this apparent contradiction in the literature.
2 In particular, we show that EV's results hinge crucially on their failure to allow for a direct impact of higher oil wealth on money demand. This omission is in our view difficult to justify. On liquidity grounds alone, to the extent that the oil revenue accrues as a transfer to the private sector it should "' The views expressed are those of the authors and should not be interpreted as reflecting the views of the World Bank or any of its affiliated organisations. Helpful comments fromJ. Hutton, D. Norton, P. Spencer and A.J. Venables and support from the Committee for Social Science Research in Ireland are gratefully acknowledged.
1 The explanation is straightforward: if the oil wealth becomes known now, but the spending it allows will only come on stream sometime in the future (say at time T), a discrete appreciation would have to take place at T if nothing happened before then for standard 'Dutch Disease' reasons (cf. Corden and Neary (1982) and Wijnbergen (1980) ). This would imply anticipated infinite capital gains at Tfor holders of sterling assets. Asset-market arbitrage will ensure however that such gains will not be realised: a current appreciation will result to such an extent that the jump at Twill be ruled out. The implications for the real economy are clear: an appreciation now while domestiC spending does not respond until after T switches demand away from home goods with a recession as a result.
2 The first version of this note Was written simply as a comment on EV. \Ve are grateful to a referee for pointing out that the substance of our criticism is implicit in Buiter and Purvis.
[ 390 ] (JUNE 198.1) COMMENT ON EASTWOOD "AND VENABLES 39 1 raise 'transad:ions demand· for money directly~ Probably more important is its asset effect as a result of the oil-induced increase in. wealth: Even when all the oil revenue accrues to the government, this should raise private sector wealth through the anticipated reduction in ft.i'tore tax liabilities. In any c~se, we find it difficult to conceive a situation in which, an oil discovery would raise spending but leave money demand permanently unaffected.· The purpose of our note is to show the important implications of this observation for the effects of an oil discovery when appropriate monetary accommodation does not take place.
I. THE EV MODEL AMENDED
The model" we use is identical to the EV model (which in turn builds ori Dornbusch ( 1 976)) except for the inclusion of a direct wealth ·effect in money demand. The aggregates in this model are money m, an interest-bearing asset, actual output y, 'normal' output fj, the price of domestic output p, the exchange rate e (the dorpes.tic currency cost of a unit of foreign e~change) and the foreign and domestic interest rates r*, r .. (All variables arc logs ·except r* and r.)frepresents the infinite term annuity valUe of the oil wealth in foreign ·currency. 1 The model equations, with all parameters defined to be positive, are:
(1) gives money market equilibrium, 2 (2) asset market arbitrage between perfectlysubstitutableforeign and domestic bonds coupled with the assumption of perfect foresight, 3 (3) represents short-run goods market equilibrium and (4) · · 1 We follow EV in measuring the.real present value of oil wealth in home currency by.f+e-p. This may be.calculated in cith!!r of two equivalent ways: either by capitalising the stream of future foreign currency oil receipts at 'the (constant). foreign real interest rate, r•, and then converting. to home currency at the current real exchange rate, e-p; or, by convi;:rtilig future revenues to home currency at the appropriate real exchange rate.and then capitalising this stream at the (variable) own rate of interest on home goods, ,• + e-p. A. formal demonstration cir the equivalence or these t~o approaches is availabli!· from the authors. '
. .
. 1 A referee has ·pointed out that our result would be strengthened by putting cxj:icnditurc A (= y(y+f+e-p)),as an argument in our money demand function. This can easily be seen.to be correct by inserting the expression for A ~n. ~ 1)' to,,gct:
This looks like our equation but with a bigg~ impact of an increase inf on mo~cy demand (t:+</>Y instead of e). To maintain conformity with EV however we chose to adhere to their moncy·dcmand formulation. . . · . , a We follow EV in assuming that exchange-rate expectations are rational ·but none of our conclusions depend on 'this. As shown in Neary (1g82), the initial reccssfonary impact of the oil discovery in' the case considered in Fig.· 1 below is greater under static (I -a.) 11-e8j (6).
y.=m+
These.expressions are equal to (13) and (14) in .EV for e = o. Equation (5) gives no surprises: more oil (a rise inf) leads to a long-run nominal appreciation (a fall in e) that is larger the stronger the wealth effect e. Equation (6) is · qualitatively different however. The wealth effect leads to a higher real money demarid after an increase inf which must be accommodated (given the nominal supply) by a smaller increase in the domesti.c price tha~ in the EV case (e =.o) or even a decline. . . The case where the domestic price rises.in: the long run, (1 -ci:)11 > e8, yields results similar to those obtained by EV. We therefore focus in the reriuunder of this comment on the alternative c~se, (1 -:-:a.)11 < e8. Inverting (1) and substituting (2).and (3) into (1) and (4) leads to the equati9ns d~scribing the time path of e andp: ' .
· · ·-[A.(8+11) +u(a.:_e)] (p-p)). (8)
If We make assumptions analogous to th~se mad~ by EV (op. cit., p: 291),
] u, and if we assume that there is rto lag in the adjustment of domestic spending . to. the oil discovery, the diagrammatic representation of (7) and (8) is given in Fig. 1 .
:After the discovery, the economy immediately-jumps from E to D and then gradually slides do,wn from D to (;'along the saddle-point path asscciated wi_th the negative root. During this process (along DC) the exchange rate gradually depreciates after the initial discrete appreciation, another· example of over.:. shooting (additional to those of Dornbusch. (I 976) and Neary ' ancC Purvis ( 1981) ). More important is the fact that along DC the domestic price falls, indicating that the economy is in rec~ssion (!/ < ff yv_h_eri p <: () from· (4)) :. The wealth effect of the oil disco'{ery causes such a_ huge appreciation tha·t the in'crease in aggregate demand it also triggers is insufficient to offset the defl,ationary impact which the initial appreciaticn has on the goods market. . . . This result is purely due t-J the wealth effect of the resource discovery on ~oney demand and .is impossible in the· EV C'.)nfig~ration (i.e. when .e ~ o). Consider now the case where there is a lag in spending (Fig. 2) . Oil is· discovered at time o, but spending out of.oil ~ev~nue is zero until T and. thereafter In this note we amend the EV analysis of the potential recessionary impact of higher oil revenues by incorporating a direct w.ealth effect on asset markets. Clearly, with a strictly positive wealth elasticity of money demand, higher wealth· leads to an incipient excess demand for money after an oil discovery; to accommodate this. the real money stock has to rise. This leads first to a greater ap.,. preciation of the exchange rate and to a lower post-shock equilibrium price level than in the case considered by EV. In fact we show that the possibility of an actual decline in th!! domestic price cannot be ruled,out. 2 In that case higher oil revenues lead to a recession even without a spending lag; moreover, if there is a spending lag we show that the recession induced by the nominal exchange rate appreciation taking place 'up front, wi\l not. be followed by a boom once spending responds but will continue. past that time instead. The root of the problem is that the direct wealth effect of high.er oil wealth increases the demand for money, which, given the nominal money supply, subjects the economy to a c-.mtractionary shock which may be sufficiently great to offset the direct expansionary effects of the ·oil discovery on domestic spending. The policy con-1 Of course,. the same capital-m11rket imperfections which give rise to the spending lag may also delay the oil discovery's effect on money de.mand. It can easily be checked that assuming a lagged response of money de.mand is unlikely.to affect our principal qualitative conclusion that p falls steadily and hence that the economy remains in recession until the new long-run equilibrium at Cis attained.
2 It is easily shown that the rece5sionary outcome is consistent with plausible values for the key parameters. For example, assuming t!iat ci: {the share of domestic goods in spending) equals 0·75, 11 (the marginal propensity to absorb domestii: output out of oil wealth, expressed· as an elasticity) equals o·6 and 8 {the price eiasticity of demand for domestic o.utput) equals 0·5, a recession must ensue for any value of e (the oil-wealth elasticity of money demand) in excess of 0·30. Some evidence suggesting tl:ie empirical likelihood of the case we consider is given by Bond and Knob! (19811) and Spencer (1983) .
